Philip Davies (Shipley, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) Snatch Vixen and (b) Snatch Land Rover vehicles are in use in Afghanistan.

    
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)

Snatch 2a, Snatch Vixen and Snatch Vixen Plus are currently deployed in Afghanistan. Of these, Snatch 2a and Snatch Vixen are used only inside base locations. Snatch 2a is in the process of being withdrawn from Afghanistan.

I am withholding the information on the number of vehicles deployed in Afghanistan as its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces.

    

Edited by Elaine - 06 Jul 2010 at 11:42am

Police banned from using ‘unsafe’ Snatch Land Rovers in Iraq
British police officers working in Iraq were banned from travelling in Snatch Land Rovers after the deaths of dozens of military personnel who were forced to use the vehicles.

By Rosa Prince, Political Correspondent
Published: 5:44PM BST 29 Jun 2010

Paul Kernaghan, a former chief constable who responsible for seconding police to train their Iraqi counterparts, disclosed that he stopped officers from using the lightly armoured Snatch Land Rovers amid concerns about their safety.

Civilians working for the Foreign Office had already been barred from travelling in the vehicles, leading to anger in military circles, where they were still in common usage.


In a witness statement to the Iraq inquiry, Mr Kernaghan said: "I recognise that no vehicle can guarantee total protection from IEDs (improvised explosive devices) or sustained firearms attack, but I felt Snatch Land Rovers were unacceptable in terms of the operational environment.

"I know this meant police officers were treated differently from soldiers, but police officers are not soldiers and different considerations apply.

"I also recognise that military commanders had to operate with the resources at hand, but I insisted that my officers be conveyed in vehicles similar to those allocated to FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) personnel."

The Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq war, which has resumed its public hearings after a break for last month’s general election, also heard fresh claims about the legality of the 2003 invasion.

Sir John Holmes, Britain's ambassador to Paris at the time, rejected claims by Lord Goldsmith, the then-attorney general, that he could not have contacted the French Government for views about whether it was legal in international law to topple Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator.

Giving evidence earlier this year, Lord Goldsmith told the inquiry that he had consulted politicians from the United States and White House legal advisers for their views on the legality of the proposed invasion, but insisted that he could not have approached the French, who were opposed to military action.

But Sir John told the inquiry: "I don't see why he couldn't have done, or at least had somebody else ask the question on his behalf.”

    

Edited by Elaine - 25 Jul 2010 at 10:06pm

Ministers were warned FOUR YEARS ago that Snatch Land Rovers needed replacing

By Mail Online Reporter
Last updated at 5:04 PM on 27th July 2010

Ministers were formally warned that the military needed an alternative to the Snatch Land Rover part-way through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, previously secret documents disclosed today.

A general told the Government in July 2006 that front-line commanders wanted better-protected vehicles so they could carry out missions 'without unnecessary casualties'.

But British troops continued to be killed and injured in the lightly armoured Snatch, which is vulnerable to roadside bombs, for several more years.

A declassified memo to Ministers from Lieutenant General Sir Nicholas Houghton, then-Chief of Joint Operations at the military's Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), was released by the Iraq Inquiry today.

The senior officer confirmed that commanders required an alternative to the use of the Snatch or tracked armoured vehicles on current operations.

Lt Gen Houghton wrote: 'We need a medium-weight PPV (protected patrol vehicle) in order to provide a significantly enhanced physical protection against EFP IEDs (explosively formed projectile improvised explosive devices) and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) in order to prosecute our missions successfully without unnecessary casualties.

'Only a balanced force will give the operational commander the optimum flexibility to meet the range of tasks based on an assessment of threat and risk. The front-line commands share this assessment.'


The letter was sent to defence procurement minister Lord Drayson and copied to defence secretary Des Browne and armed forces minister Adam Ingram as well as the defence chiefs of staff.

The Government was already conscious of criticism of the use of the Snatch Land Rover, which critics have blamed for the deaths of dozens of UK servicemen and women in roadside bomb attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Corporal Sarah Bryant, 26, and three other soldiers were killed while travelling in a Snatch in 2008

Corporal Sarah Bryant, 26, and three other soldiers were killed while travelling in a Snatch in 2008

A hand-written annotation to the memo reads: 'NB Note Ministers can no longer say in the House that they have had no request from commanders for an alternative to the Snatch.'

Lord Drayson's assistant private secretary wrote back requesting advice on how to get the required number of new more heavily-armoured vehicles ready to send to Iraq in November 2006.

Among the British troops killed travelling in Snatch Land Rovers after Lt Gen Houghton's July 7 2006 memo were Marine Gary Wright, 22, who died in Helmand province in Afghanistan in October 2006, and Lance Corporal Kirk Redpath, 22, who died near Basra in Iraq in August 2007.

Corporal Sarah Bryant, 26, Corporal Sean Robert Reeve, 28, Lance Corporal Richard Larkin, 39, and Private Paul Stout, 31, died when their Snatch was hit by a roadside bomb in Helmand in June 2008.

Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fulton, deputy chief of defence staff (equipment capability) from 2003 to 2006, defended the military's response to growing concerns about the vulnerability of the Snatch Land Rover.

He told the Iraq Inquiry that as much extra armour was added to the vehicle as possible, but eventually an alternative was needed.

'This was a constant process of adding more and more protection,' he said. Of course there is going to come a time when the enemy has gone on adding kilograms of explosive and you can't go on adding kilograms of steel, and therefore there has to be a step change.'

His successor, Lieutenant General Andrew Figgures, said the more heavily-armoured Mastiff vehicle was not available for British commanders to buy before 2006.

He told the inquiry: 'My judgment would be that every waking hour that people had, they were attempting to solve the problem in this area. But if there's no technical solution to it... you can't do it.'

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1298076/Ministers-warned-FOUR-YEARS-ago-Snatch-Land-Rovers-needed-replacing.html#ixzz0uuSgvcFp

    

Edited by Elaine - 27 Jul 2010 at 7:46pm

Ministers were warned FOUR YEARS ago that Snatch Land Rovers needed replacing

By Ian Drury - Mail
Last updated at 12:58 AM on 28th July 2010

Relatives of soldiers killed in Snatch Land Rovers spoke of their fury yesterday after it emerged ministers knew in 2006 the vehicles were vulnerable to roadside bombs but did nothing for two years.

A secret memo from a senior UK general warned the then Labour government that the lightly-armoured vehicles were not suitable for use on the IED-strewn battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

But another 20 servicemen and women died and scores more were injured travelling in the Snatch Land Rovers – dubbed ‘mobile coffins’ because of their vulnerability to blasts – before ministers finally agreed to agoreplace them in 2008.

In total, the vehicles have been blamed for 37 British deaths.
Lack of protection: A general told the Government in 2006 that soldiers needed something other than Snatch Land Rovers


Classified documents proving ministers were aware the military had serious concerns about the safety of troops using the thin-skinned vehicles were published by the Iraq Inquiry.

The revelation was greeted angrily by the relatives of soldiers who died in the Land Rovers. They said it was another example of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown skimping on proper equipment for the Armed Forces.
Corporal Sarah Bryant, 26, and three other soldiers were killed while travelling in a Snatch in 2008


Lieutenant General Sir Nicholas Houghton, then chief of joint operations at the military’s Permanent Joint Headquarters, wrote to ministers in July 2006 explaining front-line commanders’ concerns.

He said: ‘We need a medium-weight PPV [protected patrol vehicle] in order to provide a significantly enhanced physical protection against IEDs and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] in order to prosecute our missions successfully without unnecessary casualties.

‘Only a balanced force will give the operational commander the optimum flexibility to meet the range of tasks.’

Despite pledging to send more heavily-armoured vehicles to Iraq and Afghanistan, a month-long review by then defence secretary Des Browne concluded that the vehicles provided the best mobility for the difficult terrain.

But he finally acted at the end of 2008 after Corporal Sarah Bryant, 26, became the only woman to die in Afghanistan when her vehicle was blown up by a roadside bomb near Lashkar Gah.

He announced a £700million investment in more than 700 vehicles to offer troops greater protection. However, the Snatch replacement has still not been delivered.

Yesterday Susan Smith, from Tamworth, Staffordshire, whose son, Private Phillip Hewett, 21, died in a Snatch in Iraq in July 2005, spoke of her outrage after hearing the memo disclosed at the inquiry.

She said: ‘It makes me very angry. It’s five years tomorrow since I had my son’s cremation, and I’m in there listening to these people telling us that basically they could have done something earlier but they chose to take their time and do it later.

‘The most tragic part for me is that Phillip was about the ninth or tenth that died. Subsequently 28 others died. Someone should be held to account for that, someone should be taking responsibility.’

Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fulton, deputy chief of defence staff from 2003 to 2006, defended the military’s response.

He said: ‘There was a constant process of adding more and more protection. Of course there is going to come a time when the enemy has gone on adding kilograms of explosive and you can’t go on adding kilograms of steel, and therefore there has to be a step change.’



Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1298076/Ministers-warned-FOUR-YEARS-ago-Snatch-Land-Rovers-needed-replacing.html#ixzz0uxeOnGCy

    

Edited by Elaine - 28 Jul 2010 at 8:52am

EU Referendum:-

Watching three days-worth of oral evidence at the Chilcot inquiry on the Iraq war is not for the faint-hearted, but it is better watching the video over the internet than being there.

The reason for so doing is to follow the strains of evidence related to the Snatch Land Rover and especially relevant was Tuesday's evidence from Lt Gen Sir Robert Fulton, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability) from 2003 to 2006, and his successor, Lt Gen Andrew Figgures. He held the post from 2006 to 2009.

I write this with some diffidence, but am bolstered by the comments of a contact with whom I have been working these many years. He articulated by own impressions – that these two senior generals, when it comes to protected vehicles and IEDs, are extraordinarily ignorant. If you have the time, watch the performance of Fulton (pictured). It is lamentable.

But with Dannatt yesterday, if you put the narrative together, from the evidence, you come inescapably to the conclusion that the Army blew it. When it came to protecting troops from IEDs, as Dannatt himself says, "It remains unsatisfactory that it is only now that we have closed with the issue ... We worked round the problem, we didn't actually confront the problem."

We also get from Dannatt some extraordinary claims about the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES). The man actually tells us that this had originally been envisaged in 2002 as a "short to medium term requirement" with the first vehicles to enter service in 2007.

Once again, Dannatt betrays his own ignorance. It may be difficult to understand that the professional head of the Army can be completely out of touch but, like politicians, senior officers also live in their "bubbles", completely divorced from the real world.

One of the reasons why the Israeli Army was so successful is that it was largely staffed by reserve officers, who had real jobs outside the Army. British Generals, with their Army mansions, their servants, chauffeur-driven limousines, and deferential staff, are dangerously insulated from reality. They really are terrifyingly out of touch.

Even then, if Dannatt really believed that FRES was going to be operational by 2007, then he is worse than ignorant. He displays a naivety of almost staggering proportions, neglecting as he does the last word of the acronym: "system".

FRES is what the US was calling FCS, the Future Combat System. It always was going to be complex and it was always much, much more than a vehicle replacement programme. It was to be a whole new way of fighting, part of the revolution in military affairs. It was to redefine military operations in the post-Cold War era.

Yet Dannatt claims he was "horrified" to learn in 2005 that the project had grown in cost and sophistication, with the delivery date put back to between 2015 and 2018. If he really expected otherwise and was at all surprised, then one really must wonder where he was ... to which monastery he had retired.

The thing is that even I was writing about FRES in 2004. Yesterday six years ago to the day, I wrote my first piece on the system, following up today, six years ago, with another piece. Don't take my word for it. Look at it, on the record. Six years ago, on 29 July 2004, I wrote:

    ... the government is preparing to sink around £6 billion into buying 900 vehicles, with an estimated budget for the total costs of ownership over the expected 30-year service life of almost £50 billion. That is a staggering £6.7 million average cost to buy each vehicle and an unbelievable life-time cost per vehicle – yes, each vehicle - of £55.5 million. To say that it would be cheaper to drive our troops into battle in a fleet of top-of-the-range Rolls-Royces hardly begins to illustrate the extravagance.

If I was writing that sort of thing then, how can Dannatt claim that he learned only a year later that, "the project had grown in cost and sophistication"? For that to be true, he must have been on another planet, or tucked away in that monastery.

If we did not know him better, we might think he is taking us for fools. In reality, the man has by now convinced himself that what he believes to be the truth is the truth. There are people like that. He is one of them. And the media, which has never followed FRES properly, nor understood it - any more than has the likes of Dannatt - allows him to get away with it. The journalists currently reporting on the issue have neither understanding nor history.

With Dannatt's evidence though, with Fulton, Figgures, and Jackson who also gave evidence yesterday, there can be no doubt that the MoD held off acquiring protected vehicles to protect the funding for FRES. There can also be no doubt that it took the politicians to push the military into acquiring the Mastiff.

Yet the journalists are completely misreading events. Both The Guardian and The Daily Mail are at it as well. They are inverting the truth with their narrative that the Army was warning ministers about vehicle deficiencies. But the Army was not. The minsters were kicking the Army, telling it to get protected vehicles ordered.

And, as a final twist, we learn from Fulton, that the military already had a replacement for the Snatch lined up - the Vector. In their minds, they did not need anything else when they already had something in mind. Left to themselves, Vector would have gone into Iraq as well as Afghanistan. That was the original plan. Even more would have died than actually did, had the Army been allowed to run the show.

The problem is, does anyone care – do they care enough to get it right, or is everyone seemingly content that a completely distorted view of history should prevail?